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Introduction 
What effects do Pro-Government Militias (PGMs) have upon the dynamics of 
violence during civil war? PGMs are organized armed groups that are aligned with the 
incumbent but not identified as members of the conventional armed force.1 Existing 
literature has largely overlooked the broader effects that PGMs have upon the nature 
and intensity of civil violence. For while previous research has shown a relationship 
between the presence of PGMs and conflict escalation along ethnic lines, few studies 
have discussed the underlying mechanisms through which the delegation of tasks to 
PGMs shapes the targets of violence in civil war.2 This article partially addresses this 
gap in the literature, exploring the effects that the presence of a specific type of PGM, 
civilian defense forces (CDF), can have on insurgent violence towards civilians. To do 
this, this article focuses on the Sunni Awakening and the ancillary Sons of Iraq militia 
recruited by the US during their counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq.  
Between 2005 and 2008 US military forces encouraged Sunni tribal groups to 
turn against the insurgent movement across various parts of Iraq. Originally 
concentrated in the Al-Anbar, Salah-ad-Din, Diyala and Baghdad districts, the Sunni 
Awakening saw Sunni tribal groups violently turn against the insurgency. This 
Awakening was later consolidated into a semi-official PGM called the Sons of Iraq, 
which eventually included over 100,000 paramilitary fighters operating in more than 
two-thirds of Iraqi provinces. This article argues that the Sunni Awakening militia fall 
into the category of civilian defense force (CDF), a distinct form of militia that have 
been largely overlooked by civil war scholars.3 Like other CDFs, the Sunni militia were 
recruited from local populations, operated only within their home territory (i.e. are 
sedentary), and had little offensive capability.4  
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Existing academic and military literature has described the important role that 
the Sunni militia played in the US counter-insurgency campaign, specifically during the 
transition from insurgent to incumbent control in Al-Anbar province.5 However, it 
remains unclear what the effects of encouraging civilian active collaboration against the 
insurgents were during this time.  This article argues that the formation of CDFs 
effectively refocuses the primary targets of insurgent violence from the incumbent to 
civilians. When faced with a recalcitrant and actively hostile local population, the 
insurgents retaliate to deter future defections and re-establish their control over 
contested areas.  During the time of transition from insurgent to incumbent control, the 
emergence of a CDF affects the targets of insurgent violence and its intensity. This, 
coupled with increased counter-insurgent activity, creates a short-term spike of 
violence.   
This claim is assessed using a combination of descriptive data and testimonies 
from those involved in the Awakening. The results demonstrate that at least in the Al-
Anbar province of Iraq, where the Sunni Awakening and the ancillary Sons of Iraq 
program were initiated, the creation of the CDF groups resulted in a predicted spike in 
Iraqi civilian deaths. Our single case analysis, although not without its limitations,  
generates inferences applicable to other contexts regarding the consequences of 
delegating tasks to a CDF. This article therefore provides an important contribution to 
the counter-insurgency literature, as well as the growing collection of work centered on 
the effects of pro-government militias, insurgent group fragmentation, defection and 
side-switching.6  It also has significant ethical and policy implications regarding the use 
of similar CDF strategies elsewhere. This article proceeds by highlighting the 
underlying rationale in the supporting civilian groups against insurgents.  A theory 
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linking CDFs to a change in the dynamics of civil war violence is then presented. 
Finally, the method of analysis is discussed before the results are presented.   
Civilian Defense Forces  
Categorization  
CDFs are a specific form of militia, distinct from other similar para-institutional armed 
actors. Firstly, they are recruited from the civilian and insurgent population. Unlike 
other militias, such as the organization of ‘native’ paramilitary armies (e.g. Sepoys), 
CDFs are composed of civilians and defected insurgents from within specific areas 
contested by the incumbent and insurgent forces. Secondly, they are not mobile fighting 
forces, such as the Janjaweed militias in Sudan, but remain sedentary within the areas 
from which they were mobilized. Thirdly, unlike other militia forces, CDFs are usually 
not overtly offensive in nature, but are delegated intelligence, security, and limited 
combat roles within their local areas.7 Unlike paramilitary ‘death squads’ ubiquitous in 
many Latin American countries during the Cold War, CDFs do not actively seek to 
engage or ‘neutralize’ insurgents and their civilian sympathizers. CDFs therefore 
constitute pro-incumbent militias that harness the active participation of civilians and 
defected members of the insurgency in the counterinsurgency effort, taking up 
intelligence, security and limited combat roles. Either emerging autonomously from 
state direction or mobilized directly by incumbent forces, CDF are common features in 
irregular wars ranging from the ‘civil defense patrols’ in Peru (1980-2000) and 
Guatemala (1981-1996) to Turkish ‘Village Guards’ and Filipino Citizen Armed Force 
Geographical Units (CAFGU).  
Rationale for use of CDF I: Identifying insurgents  
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The organization of civilian populations into local CDFs and the utilization of such pre-
existing civilian-based militias are a well-established tenet of counterinsurgency 
thinking.8 Primarily, such forces help incumbents overcome the identification problem. 
Rebels often mix in with local populations, making it difficult for the incumbent forces 
to identify the insurgents. In the absence of reliable intelligence incumbents are often 
forced to deploy indiscriminate forms of violence, targeting innocent people loosely 
affiliated with an insurgency, in an attempt to modify the behavior of the ‘guilty’ 
parties.9 This can often be a counterproductive approach, alienating the very people the 
incumbent is attempting to win over to their side. 
 The mobilization of local civilians into anti-insurgent forces is often seen as a 
way in which the incumbents can overcome the challenge of identification. CDFs are 
comprised of local residents and insurgent defectors who can readily identify insurgents 
living among them. Members of local communities generally know who the cell 
members are, or at the least those residents likely to be hiding them.10  In this way, local 
militia forces can act in their own “self-defense”, attacking insurgents and denying them 
access to local communities. In addition, they can aid incumbent forces to identify and 
locate insurgents selectively. As an example of this, many US counterinsurgent training 
manuals dating back to the Cold War elucidate how the CDF concept is conceived as 
an efficient way to separate the insurgents and suspected sympathizers from the rest of 
the local population.11 
Rationale for use of CDF II: Increasing local support 
Secondly, according to the counterinsurgency literature, using CDFs is an expedient 
means through which the incumbent can gain the allegiance and active participation of 
local inhabitants, denying insurgents control of the people and access to their resources.  
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Irregular warfare is a politico-military struggle, largely centered on the battle to control 
or influence the population. Winning an irregular war therefore depends not only upon 
military might, but on the ability of both sides to mobilize support for their cause and 
deter collaboration with their opponents.12 In this sense CDF paramilitarism is a 
political tool, in which the local populations increase their support for the government 
by participating in their own defense. By mobilizing the population in support of the 
counterinsurgent cause, the incumbent erodes the popular support for the insurgency 
and encourages insurgent defection.13 The organization and mobilization of civilians to 
support the incumbent through their active participation in counterinsurgent activities, 
including combat, is a popular counterinsurgent tactic.14  The subcontracting of defense 
and combat capabilities to local populations is meant to aid incumbent forces to win the 
support of the civil population and identify those who do not.  
The effects of CDFs: Civilianizing warfare 
Building on these well-established functional roles of government-sided CDF militias 
(reducing the problem of identification, and increasing the active support of the local 
population), we argue that the delegation of security and combat roles to local civilian 
groups has two additional and simultaneous effects. Firstly, the mobilization of a CDF 
has a significant impact upon the targets of insurgent violence. The formation of CDF 
is inherently an exercise against the insurgents, reducing their support from local 
populations. Consequently, insurgents often resort to violence to deter civilians from 
defecting from the insurgent cause, and joining the CDF program.15  As the civilian 
population is persuaded to actively engage in actions against the insurgents (both in a 
security role denying insurgents sanctuary and combat against them), a wedge is driven 
between the insurgents and the population, demanding a response from insurgent 
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groups. This result is sometimes acknowledged in US counterinsurgency doctrine. For 
example, appendix D of a wikileaked 2003 Special Forces training manual is 
particularly candid about the politico-military function of ‘CDF’ paramilitary 
organizations. It states that when the Civilian Self Defense Force (CSDF) concept is 
implemented, 
The insurgents have no choice; they have to attack the CSDF village to provide a 
lesson to other villages considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological 
effectiveness of the CSDF concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of 
making the government the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical 
threshold - that of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed 
to be liberating.16  
In this way, the organization of local defense units or the delegation of tasks to such 
forces is meant to neutralize the insurgent’s efforts to gain support from the people. The 
insurgents are required to fight for the support of the population as they try to avoid the 
loss of civilian control and cooperation. The strategy is therefore ethically complex, 
with counterinsurgents instigating a position in which insurgents are likely to escalate 
violence (and against civilians).  Yet, it is ultimately the insurgents themselves who 
must take responsibility for their chosen course of actions.  
 Secondly, in relation to this, provoking defection from the insurgency is an 
important component of the CDF concept, causing or at least facilitating insurgent 
group fragmentation and infighting. The implementation of a CDF policy helps to 
deteriorate the cohesion of the insurgent movement.17 The local populations’ gradual 
acceptance of the CDF program causes the insurgency to fold in on itself, as local 
civilians who previously provided active (i.e. joining in the insurgency) and passive 
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support to the insurgents defect from the insurgent cause and join in active collaboration 
against the insurgency. The defection of local civilians and insurgents represents a threat 
to the strength and stability of the insurgency. In response to this threat remaining 
insurgents are likely to focus their violent attention on actual and potential defectors. 
Side-switching in this way is a common feature of irregular warfare, which 
counterinsurgents can exploit to their advantage. Leveraging civilian populations to join 
in active collaboration with the incumbents therefore shifts the primary targets of 
insurgent violence downwards away from the incumbent state forces and onto local 
civilians, as well as inwards against defectors, as control is wrestled from the insurgents 
and they lose their support base.  In other words, a central dynamic that results in 
leveraging CDF forces is a redirection of insurgent attacks downwards and inwards 
towards those that no longer support them. 
However, as incumbent forces gain control of region the intensity of violence 
should significantly subside.18 The intensity of the insurgent violence against civilian 
populations, adapting Kalyvas’ logic, is a function of the level of insurgent control.19 In 
areas of contested sovereignty, disputants compete for denunciations and defections (in 
this case with the CDF program), and thus there is a high likelihood of indiscriminate 
violence against civilians.20 However, once a CDF has gained the active participation 
of the local communities, the possibilities for insurgent infiltration are minimized. 
Therefore violence against civilians is most likely is the period of transition from 
insurgent to incumbent control in which the CDF triggers side-switching and fear of 
defection within the insurgent movement. We therefore argue that the mobilization of 
CDF forces produces a short-term spike in the intensity of violence amongst and 
towards local populations, but then stabilizes if and when control is attained.   
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Thus, in the short-run we should expect to see the formation of a CDF increase 
violence against civilians. In many cases the increased targeting of civilians will reduce 
the level of violence against state forces, although there is always the possibility 
insurgents continue on a dual track of attacking both incumbents and seeking to prevent 
defection. However, the imminent threat posed by the formation of a CDF in areas under 
insurgent control should provide considerable cause for concern amongst insurgent 
organizers. Thus, insurgents should be expected to increasingly target inwards to 
discourage defection amongst their ranks and downwards against local populations 
from supporting the anti-insurgent movement. While recent literature has been attentive 
to many of the causes of insurgent violence against civilians21, this article develops this 
work by examining the mechanisms at play in leveraging CDF and the dynamics of 
violence against civilians that this can cause.  
Assessing the impact of Civilian Defense Forces: The case of Iraq 
The Sunni Awakening and the subsequent creation of the Sons of Iraq program in Al-
Anbar province from 2005 to 2009 offers an ideal case to assess the effect of CDFs. In 
2004 to 2006 Coalition forces had ‘lost’ militarily in Al-Anbar province against the anti-
occupation insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).22 Insurgents retained control over 
many areas and even proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant.23 Major cities such as Ramadi and Fallujah were largely under insurgent 
control, supported by various local Sunni tribal groups. Across Iraq attacks against 
Coalition forces grew to their highest levels. Moreover, in the absence of reliable 
intelligence, Coalition forces adopted an  indiscriminate form of  force against their 
‘enemies’, best exemplified by the search and destroy tactics used in the re-capture of 
Fallujah and the Haditha incident.24  
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Yet in a dramatic turn-around of events that began in late 2005 and continued 
through to 2007, various Sunni tribes shifted their allegiance from the insurgency and 
AQI to form an alliance with the Coalition forces. This Sunni Awakening, or al-Sahwa 
in Arabic, arose out of a combination of complex divisions primarily between Sunni 
tribal leaders and their perceived loss of power vis-à-vis members of al-Qaeda.25 The 
Sunni Awakening and the defection of numerous tribes from the insurgency was not 
really a product of Coalition counter-insurgent design, but driven by independent forces.  
However, it is clear that the US military support for side-switching of this kind was an 
essential element that provoked its growth. For US military commanders encouraged 
defection, turned a blind eye to vigilante attacks against the insurgency and civilians 
supporting it, and clearly supported the establishment of the Sunni Awakening councils 
in September 2006.26  Supporting the Awakening formed part of an intentional (albeit 
unexpected) counterinsurgent strategy on behalf of the US commanders to stabilize Al-
Anbar province starting in Ramadi.27 Ad-hoc alliances were forged in order to use tribal 
affiliations, local knowledge, and local population’s active resistance to expel the 
insurgents and AQI from areas under insurgent control. Before the official 
establishment of the Sons of Iraq program, groups of “awakened” tribal members 
conducted attacks on known insurgents and AQI members as part of a militia called 
“Thuwar al-Anbar”, to which US forces turned a blind-eye or actively supported.28 It is 
this period of side-switching in Anbar which is most important for the present study. 
The Awakening process as well as Coalition control over Anbar province was 
later consolidated by the US military in the summer of 2007 with the establishment of 
a semi-official civilian militia originally titled ‘Concerned Local Citizens’ at the outset 
and then later revised to Sons of Iraq (SOI). Many defectors, some of which were 
previously part of the insurgency, were handed responsibility for local security and 
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given a “special mandate to suppress, arrest, or kill local jihadist cadre”.29 Originally 
concentrated in the Al-Anbar, Salah-ad-Din, Diyala and Baghdad districts, the SOI 
program then rapidly expanded to include over 100,000 paramilitary fighters at its peak 
in 2008. The SOI eventually operated in more than two-thirds of Iraqi provinces, 
helping to increase Coalition control in previously contested areas (e.g. Anbar). The 
SOI helped to defend their own interests within their community, but also functioned as 
contracted military forces for the Coalition. Each ‘Son’ received $300 monthly salary 
for their services, which cost the US around $16 million a month throughout 2008.30 
Existing analyses of the Awakening have tended to focus on explaining its rise and 
analyzing its potential political ramifications.31 To date only limited attention has been 
focused on examining the effect that the Sunni Awakening had upon the dynamics of 
violence in Iraq.  
Observable implications 
Figure 1 below presents the key events within the US-led counterinsurgency campaign 
along a simple timeline. These events suggest four distinct time periods within which 
the campaign was fought in the Anbar province. The time period prior to t-1 represents 
counterinsurgency within Iraq prior to the Sunni Awakening in which insurgent forces 
had control over much of Anbar province.  The threshold t - 1 (May 2006) represents 
the point at which the Sunni Awakening began to arise, a few months before its official 
proclamation.32 This crucial time-period (between t-1 and t) involved Sunni tribal 
leaders defecting from the insurgency and eventually formally announcing their 
renunciation through the formation the Awakening councils in Al-Anbar province. 
While the official announcement occurred in September 2006 (coinciding with US 
retaking control in Ramadi), defection from the insurgency began in the previous 
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months and continued over the next year. According to our argument laid out above, we 
expect insurgent forces to respond to this defection by making those ‘awakened’ Sunni 
tribes (and supporting local communities) their primary targets in order to deter future 
defections and punish those that have done. Second, those individuals and tribal groups 
defected to the Sunni Awakening should attack those remaining insurgents living within 
their communities. Therefore according to our theory, between t-1 and t we should 
observe a significant increase in Iraqi civilian deaths. 
 
Figure 1 - timeline of Iraq counterinsurgency campaign   
     
Between t and t + 1 Coalition control and the Awakening was consolidated 
primarily in Anbar province but also across much of Iraq. US commanders had begun 
to formalize and/or institutionalize the support of Sunni CDF forces. The SOI numbers 
increased from 12,000 in June 2007 at its inception, to a peak of 105,000 in May 2008 
across the country.33 By the time the SOI was institutionalized in Anbar province, 
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Coalition forces had consolidated control with increased troop numbers in the Surge, 
and should have been able to provide enhanced assistance to SOI forces to protect 
themselves and their local communities more effectively from insurgent attacks. 
Therefore, we should expect a decrease in Iraqi deaths during this time (between t and 
t + 1), as Coalition control is consolidated, with active support from the local population. 
The intense violent transition period should have occurred primarily before t (and after 
t - 1) where defections were retaliated against by insurgents. However, remaining 
insurgent attacks after t and t+1 should target CDF forces in a fight for access to the 
local population. As the SOI program formalizes past successes, insurgent control 
should be diminished, helping to create complete Coalition control of these areas and 
therefore the relative stability characterized by the post-Awakening period. Therefore 
between t and t + 1 we should observe a reduction in Iraqi deaths. 
Finally, from t + 1 as the Coalition force mission began to decline across much 
of the country, significant numbers of SOI were still in existence. The SOI continued to 
form an important part of US strategy, with security delegated to these forces and newly 
established Iraqi police forces. Moreover, Coalition forces began handing over security 
functions to the Iraqi military and police during this time, which would enable a decline 
in Coalition troop deaths. However, Iraqi deaths should remain either constant or 
decrease only slightly as remaining elements of the insurgency take reprisals against 
Sunni Awakening and SOI forces as well as the newly commissioned Iraqi military and 
police services.  The logic of the violence in irregular war should see further contest for 
control of the civilian population in which the insurgents use violent means to attempt 
to regain control over and collaboration of the local population. Hence from t + 1 we 
should observe constant or small decrease in the number of Iraqi deaths.  
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From the preceding discussion we can derive our general hypothesis:  
The onset of the Sunni Awakening and formation of local defense forces produced a 
sharp and immediate increase in civilian casualties within Al Anbar province, which 
declined as incumbent control stabilized.   
 
 
 
Research design 
Inferences generated from a single case study are less secure and generalizable than 
those resulting from a large-N analysis. Nevertheless, the analysis of a single case can 
be particularly informative for the kind of theory development proposed by this paper. 
A single case can provide a tough assessment of theory when the most likely or unlikely 
cases can be identified. Most likely cases are those in which a theory suggests that a 
particular outcome should occur within a specific context. In this case, the strength of 
the effect generated by a single variable should be so extreme that the underlying causal 
mechanisms are observable when considered alone.34 When this outcome is observed 
the theory is supported. If the outcome is not observed then the hypothesized mechanism 
underlying the theory is strongly impugned. As George and Bennett suggest, the failure 
of a theory to be confirmed within a ‘most likely’ case cannot “be blamed on the 
operation of the other variable in the framework.”35 Therefore, while cases of this nature 
do not empirically prove or disprove a theory, they can still confirm or infirm its 
potential applicability in other contexts.36 
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The Iraqi case provides a unique opportunity to assess the underlying logic of 
the violence in an irregular war (counterinsurgency). The Al-Anbar province in 2005-
2006 was largely under insurgent and AQI control. The strength of the insurgency in 
this area led the Coalition to all but abandon control of the province in 2006.37 Given 
this and the fact that the Sunni Awakening was born in Anbar, it is the most likely case 
within which we would expect to observe the impact predicted by the hypothesis: that 
the divestment of security to local civilian populations produced a sharp increase in 
civilian casualties.  
To perform this analysis we use both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
quantitative analysis is predominantly descriptive in nature. Drawing upon a range of 
both official and non-official sources we assess the variance in levels of Coalition and 
Iraqi fatalities across time. The use of aggregate data to explain local or regional level 
dynamics has in the past produced a poor match between civil war data and theory. 
Inferences at the individual or group level were commonly based upon aggregate or 
country level data. This approach falls prey to the ecological fallacy. As a result we also 
draw upon disaggregated data at the province level. While this does not fully mitigate 
the issue of aggregation, it is the lowest level of analysis feasible given the data 
available.  
Coalition deaths are taken from the iCasulties.org website. This is an 
independent resource that compiles information on casualties incurred by the Coalition 
forces in Iraq. The data is generated using reports and official press releases from the 
U.S Department of Defense, CENTCOM and the British Military of Defense.  
The numbers of Iraqi deaths are captured using the Worldwide Incidents 
Tracking System (WITS), a database compiled by the US Government. This dataset 
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includes all incidents that meet the U.S statutory criteria for terrorism, "...premeditated, 
and politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents."38 WITS is based on factual reports from a 
variety of open sources. Using this data means we include the sum fatalities suffered by 
Iraqi nationals each month, at the disaggregated province level. Rather than focus solely 
upon non-combatants all Iraqi nationals are included. This is based upon the assumption 
that independent observers, the media and military officials will not always be able to 
determine ex post the difference between non-combatants, insurgents and CDF militias. 
This is not a serious limitation given the nature of our hypothesis and the nature of this 
data based on “terrorist” incidents. More troubling is the varying credibility of the 
sources that this dataset relies upon, coupled with the selection bias that media accounts 
introduce. The issues of bias in wartime fatality counts have been raised in a number of 
previous works39  and suggest that this data should be treated with caution.  
As a result of the problematic nature of compiling accurate and detailed data, 
we also draw upon other data sources, such as Iraq Body Count40, and a collection of 
qualitative accounts of events during these crucial time-frames. For instance, we 
analyze numerous interviews conducted by the US Marines with US military personnel 
and influential Iraqi leaders, and participants in the Sunni Awakening and SOI 
program.41 We also include indicative accounts by members of the US military and the 
media on the course of events throughout the analyzed time periods.  These are primarily 
descriptive in nature and include anecdotal examples in support of our conclusions.   
Analysis 
 Figure 2 presents the total number of Coalition and Iraqi fatalities for each month from 
February 2004-September 2011 in Anbar province. In each case the data is 
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disaggregated to the month level. The dots indicate the number of Coalition fatalities, 
while the crosses indicate the monthly number of “non-combatant” Iraqi fatalities 
caused by “subnational groups or clandestine agents” or in this case, Iraqi civilian deaths 
caused by members of the insurgency.  
 Figure 2: The total number of Coalition and Iraqi battle-related deaths in Anbar 
province 2004-2011 
 
Prior to the dawn of the Sunni Awakening (t-1) the Coalition forces suffered an average 
of 29 deaths a month (σ = 18). The onset of the Sunni Awakening produced only a minor 
change in Coalition deaths with the mean rising mildly to 31 (σ = 8), but experiences a 
significant drop going into 2007. However, with the onset of the CDF movements Iraqi 
non-combatant fatalities (perpetrated by insurgent groups) increase over 100%, rising 
from an average of 27 to 52 deaths a month (σ = 22). This seems largely supportive of 
our hypothesis. The notable increase in Iraqi deaths at the onset of the Awakening 
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suggests the targets of insurgent violence begun to shift away from the Coalition and 
sharply increased the civilian targeting. This is further supported from t when Coalition 
deaths immediately decline. Coalition casualties drop by 50% to an average monthly 
death toll of 17 (σ = 8). Concurrently, Iraqi deaths due to “terrorism” reached their peak 
for the entire conflict in the first half of 2007, in which more than a hundred Iraqi 
civilians died each month. May 2007 was the most costly month in the entire conflict, 
with 212 Iraqi non-combatants reported to die as a result of violent incidents perpetuated 
by insurgents. This strongly suggests a significant change in the focus of the violence, 
with the targets of AQI and the insurgency shifting from Coalition forces to the CDF 
forces and local population.  
From May 2007 onwards the number of Iraqi deaths also declined rapidly as 
Coalition control was largely consolidated. By the end of the US troop surge, Iraqi 
deaths had fallen to lower than the pre t-1 level.42 While a little later than predicted, this 
finding appears to strongly support our hypothesis. This is further supported by the 
period following t +1, in which Coalition troop fatalities are almost completely 
eliminated – it is during this time period that security responsibilities were handed over 
to Iraqi military and police forces. At the same time, Iraqi deaths did not decline in the 
same manner, remaining at an average death toll of approximately 30 deaths a month. 
This continuation of insurgent violence between against Iraqi “non-combatants” 
suggests a period of retaliatory killings, an expected outcome resulting from the creation 
of local community militias.  
Other sources of data help to confirm the time-frame of a wave in insurgent 
violence against civilians.  For instance, the documented number of incidents conducted 
by anti-government/occupation forces in which civilians were killed in Anbar province 
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per month according to Iraq Body Count shows a steadily increasing number from late 
2005, while decreasing dramatically from the point at which the CDF alongside 
Coalition forces consolidated territorial control  from mid to late 2007  (see Figure 2 
below).    
Figure 2: The total number of incidents committed by insurgents (with civilians 
killed) in Anbar province 2003-2009 
 
  
 
The analysis suggests that the Sunni Awakening and leveraging CDF militias in 
Iraq 2006-2008 had a strong effect on the dynamics of violence that ensued in Al-Anbar 
province.  In particular, the above analysis suggests that side-switching and the creation 
of CDF do have the tendency to cause a spike in violence, and particularly amongst and 
towards civilians supporting opposing sides of the conflict.  
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However, these findings do not definitively validate the hypothesized outcome, 
primarily due to other causal mechanisms such as the surge at play during the important 
time-frame of analysis. Moreover, the data is not sufficiently disaggregated to 
conclusively demonstrate that such increases in insurgent violence against civilians in 
Anbar was directed to deter defections or as a response to Sunni tribal side switching, 
rather than an increase in operations in general for other reasons.  
Yet, personal accounts of the violence that followed the initiation of the Sunni 
Awakening and the implementation of the SOI program lend further support to our 
hypothesis. For instance, US Major Smith and Colonel Macfarland (who were both part 
of the US military mission that capitalized on the Awakening) describe how at the early 
stages of the Sunni Awakening members of the insurgency and AQI “attempted to 
intimidate future recruits by murdering and desecrating the body of a local sheik who 
had been instrumental in our early push at recruiting tribe members into the ISF [Iraqi 
Security Forces]”.43 Similarly, a number of other accounts detail how tribal leaders who 
had made the switch as well as those who were contemplating it were targeted in a 
campaign of terror by AQI and the insurgency in attempts to punish their abdication and 
deter future defections.44  
Instead of intimidating Sunni tribes, however, these terror tactics helped 
perpetuate the Sunni Awakening. They had the opposite intended effect, partially, 
according to US military accounts, of the initial support lent to such defections. Tribal 
leaders, led by Sheik Sattar gathered in Ramadi in September 2006 to organize against 
Al Qaeda, forming the Awakening Council. Immediately following the council in which 
tribal leaders were “either openly supporting the Awakening or withdrawing their 
support from [the insurgency and Al Qaeda],” many Sunni tribes began a “campaign of 
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eradication and retaliation against [insurgent] members living among them”.45 This was 
met, in turn, by further reprisals from the insurgency. Sheik Sattar Al-Rishawi, one of 
the leaders of the Sunni Awakening, for instance, was himself killed in a targeted 
explosion in 2007. Hence, AQI violence was both an effect and a cause in shifts of 
allegiance amongst Sunni tribal members. A virtuous cycle occurred whereby attacks 
by AQI helped further alienate local Sunni groups driving them into the arms of 
American forces to join the counterinsurgent effort. The Sunni Awakening and the SOI 
program further snowballed, when AQI and insurgent members retaliated for this 
disobedience by brutally attacking the Albu Soda tribal area. With US air support aiding 
the Albu Soda tribe to defend themselves, they managed to fight back the insurgents, 
killing a number of them. Subsequently, they explain, AQI’s “intimidation attempt 
spectacularly backfired: tribes joined the Awakening movement at a rate that proved 
difficult to keep up with”.46 This is crucial as the emergence and the growth of the more 
official self-defense program depended on the violent interaction between tribal groups, 
civilians in the local areas, and the insurgents including AQI. Equally important was the 
synergy with the US troop surge, which provided adequate military support and 
protection for Awakened tribal members in order for the cascade of defections and 
denunciations in the form of the CDF movement to take effect.47 
A number of people interviewed by the US military also describe how at the 
early stages of the Awakening (t-1), when much of Anbar was under AQI control, their 
defection meant they had to hide from their neighbors and members of their own tribe.48 
Moreover, all relate to how the insurgents and AQI immediately retaliated and made 
them the primary target upon their defection.  For instance, one interviewee describes 
the early stages of the Awakening and the confrontation created with the insurgency and 
members of AQI: “I started fighting Al Qaeda publicly in 2005. During this time, from 
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my cousins, my families, and my tribe’s sons, about 37 were killed because of this 
fighting”.49 He further describes how retaliation on both sides ensued as they attempted 
to punish defection. Another describes a battle that ensued after his November 2006 
defection in which he and his men “killed more than 90 people from Al Qaeda. Among 
my tribesmen, I suffered 10 more casualties, consisting of women, older people, 
children—innocent people”.50 In sum, the initial stages of the CDF turn were 
characterized by insurgent retaliation for defection and denunciation as the Awakening 
spearheaded the shift of control from the insurgents to Coalition forces. 
As Coalition control over Anbar (and other areas of Iraq) was gradually 
solidified (t+1), the Awakening and SOI, in conjunction with Coalition forces, 
contributed significantly to the relative stability. This was partially due to the fact that 
the local militia “provided a great deal of intelligence on members of insurgent groups, 
many of whom were members of their tribes”.51  Numerous US military reports confirm 
that the primary way in which the Awakening and the SOI program contributed to 
Coalition control is through the provision of intelligence, identifying insurgents and 
their whereabouts.52 Tribal leaders and SOI members had valuable knowledge of the 
local people and their activities, and they often reported on known proponents of the 
insurgency and AQI, including their neighbors and fellow members of their tribes.  One 
way to gauge this is the increase of insurgent weapon caches and IEDs found by US 
forces through intelligence provided by SOI members.53 Moreover, numerous media 
reports indicate that the insurgency continued to target members of defected tribes and 
those taking part in the SOI.54 Thus, while relatively minimal compared to the t-1 to t 
time period, after consolidation of control after t+1 members of the Awakening and the 
SOI program were targeted through 2010 and 2012 as a form of retaliation for their 
defection from the insurgency. 
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Conclusions 
This article has examined the dynamics of violence that occurred during the process of 
side-switching in the Sunni Awakening and in the creation of CDFs in Al-Anbar 
province of Iraq. The results suggest that the defection and mobilization of local civilian 
groups shifted the nature of the counterinsurgency in two important manners. Firstly, 
the delegation of security to these forces in Al-Anbar drove a wedge between the 
insurgency (AQI and Iraqi insurgents) and the local inhabitants, in which a competition 
for control over the population was waged. It therefore seems that at least in Al-Anbar 
province, gaining civilian active collaboration with counterinsurgent efforts has 
significant consequences for those involved in the short-run, especially in areas not 
under incumbent control. It has been shown how insurgents responded violently to 
defections, targeting Sunni Awakening leaders and tribal members who had defected 
from the insurgency. Throughout the process of defection in the Sunni Awakening and 
in the consolidation period of creating formalized CDF structures in the form of the 
SOI, those defecting, and the civilian population from which they were drawn, were 
made the targets of AQI and the remaining remnants of the insurgency. Secondly, as 
part of this process, such defections helped split and fractionalize the insurgency. The 
defection of tribal leaders turned members of the insurgency against themselves, 
contributing to the overall observed spike in violence against Iraqi civilians. 
From a more critical perspective, the intentional support provided to the tribal 
group’s side-switching as part of a concerted counterinsurgency effort is tantamount to 
a divide and rule-type tactic, whereupon the delegation of security and coercion to 
indigenous groups as a militia necessarily polarizes local alliances and relationships by 
forcing insurgents to respond to those that are now actively against them. This, while 
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not officially a stated part of the US counterinsurgent rationale behind the SOI program, 
is part of an interesting set of dynamics in the logic violence in irregular wars. Although 
the SOI were largely disbanded by the Shiite Al-Maliki administration, the legacy of 
the Awakening and the SOI continue to affect the course of conflict in the context of 
current (June-July, 2014) ISIS advances (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).55 
Furthermore, this model would predict comparable patterns of violence to that of the 
Awakening and SOI if similar forces were leveraged in areas under ISIS control.    
Future research could build upon the mechanisms proposed in this paper, and 
assess the validity of our argument in a broader context. CDF forces have played a 
pivotal role in wide variety of conflicts, exploring their influence on the dynamics of 
violence in a wider context could strengthen and support our findings (e.g. Guatemala, 
Peru, Philippines). In addition, a number of additional dynamics touched upon in this 
paper could be further explored to deepen our understanding of militia forces. Firstly, 
our hypothesized effect of side-switching and accompanying support for CDFs is 
dependent to a large degree on the strength of insurgent forces, the rate of defection, 
and the strength of incumbent forces to support the process of defection.  In other cases 
where, for example, incumbent forces are not strong enough to facilitate and support 
the defection process, insurgents might act differently to prevent their loss of control. 
Secondly, tribal affiliations and hierarchy may have played a key role in lubricating the 
Sunni tribes’ defection from the insurgency and the consolidation of a Sunni-American 
alliance. Once tribal leaders had declared their affiliation with the Sunni Awakening, 
lower ranking members followed suit or they faced expulsion from their tribal areas and 
risked being identified by fellow members of their tribe as part of the insurgency.  
Essentially, the nature of tribal affiliations and structures played a role in turning a 
greater number of former insurgents and neutral individuals into dedicated 
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counterinsurgents allied against al-Qaeda and the insurgency. This is an interesting 
dynamic that requires further investigation to make a firm conclusion about ethnic 
defection and recruitment into CDF force paramilitary structure.56 Finally, the presence 
of foreign forces is an area not directly addressed in this paper. In Iraq the AQI fighters 
overlapped their efforts with the indigenous insurgencies, which created divisions in the 
insurgency and helped pave the way for the Sunni Awakening.  It was the presence of 
foreign AQI members that threatened the political standing and power of Sunni tribal 
leaders to which they reacted negatively. This foreign hard-line element contrasts with 
other types of insurgencies which are more endogenous and perhaps ‘ideological’ in 
nature, such as in Latin America during the Cold War. Exploring the influence of a 
foreign element offers one interesting avenue for future studies.  
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